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Adolfo García de la Sienra is one of the most prominent philosophers of economics in the 
Spanish-speaking world. He has held a meeting of the International Network for Eco-
nomic Method in Xalapa and actively participates in the Sociedad Iberoamericana de 
Metodología Económica. Thanks to García de la Sienra, the structuralist approach to eco-
nomics is now mature, with a full-fledged analysis of some of the most significant varieties 
of economic theorizing in the 20th century. This analysis is now thoroughly presented in A 
Structuralist Theory of Economics, where we also find García de la Sienra’s own take on the 
structuralist programme, connecting it with its Suppesian roots.
The first half of the book is an introduction to the pillars of the structuralist approach. 
In Chapter 1 we find the Suppes informal structural view, articulated on set-theoretical 
predicates and data structures, in which the key epistemic notion is the observational ade-
quation between the two. Chapter 2 presents the concept of structure, drawing on the sem-
inal work of Sneed and his school, on the one hand, and Da Costa and Chuaqui, on the 
other. Structures are informally defined as “a list of sets together with relations built over 
such sets” (p. 30). García de la Sienra then formalizes this intuition using types, to classify 
power sets, and a modified version of the Ackermann-Müller theory of classes. He is then 
ready to define set-theoretical predicates rich enough to capture the complexity of actual 
scientific theories. This is illustrated, in Chapter 3, with an analysis of classical particle me-
chanics, followed by a short but effective introduction to the key elements in the Sneedian 
structuralist view of theories (theory core, theory element, and theory nets).
García de la Sienra closes the first half of the book with two additional chapters on ide-
alization and concretization (ch. 4) and measurement (ch. 5). In the former, García de la 
Sienra answers some regular objections against the ability of the structuralist view to grasp 
empirical phenomena. For García de la Sienra, scientific theories reach this grasp through 
the interplay of four items: there are, on the one hand, set-theoretical structures (intended 
applications, models of data) representing reality, but there are also, on the other hand, 
model systems (conjunctions of predicates expressing idealizations, in the sense of Mäki 
and Portides) and the real concrete systems that the former represent. This same dialec-
tic between set-theoretical structures and its empirical targets reappears in chapter 5 with 
the distinction between metrization and measurement. For García de la Sienra, metriza-
tion occurs when an empirical property is proven mensurable, according to a given unit of 
measurement. The representational theory of measurement establishes the set-theoretical 
conditions under which such property is metrizable, independently of how it is actually 
measured.
This fifth chapter starts the transition from general philosophy of science to the phi-
losophy of economics. In order to illustrate how metrization is achieved independently of 
the representational theory of measurement, García de la Sienra briefly discusses two clas-
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sical 20th century controversies: the measurement of demand functions and the measure-
ment theory debate. Chapter 6 establishes the target of any economic theory, the general 
concept of an economy, a structure covering four basic activities: production, distribution, 
exchange and consumption.
Chapter 7 covers preferences and utility where we find one of the author’s main con-
ceptual achievements. For a structuralist, a preference relation may be idealized, but it is 
nonetheless empirical, and its content should be represented by a (theoretical) utility func-
tion. The problem is that in standard microeconomic theory, utility functions are con-
tinuously differentiable, a pre-requirement for the topological analysis of economic equi-
librium. But what would be the empirical counterpart of differentiability in a preference 
relation? García de la Sienra suggests that differentiability captures a way in which the 
agent’s tastes are stable in the vicinity of any consumption menu. Capturing this appar-
ently simple intuition requires a long mathematical digression showing the correspondence 
between algebraic and geometric difference structures, and then between the latter and 
preference structures. Against instrumentalist or positivist interpretations of utility theory, 
where its mathematical apparatus would not require any empirical justification provided it 
delivered empirically successful predictions, García de la Sienra vindicates a realist account 
in which every empirically meaningful element of a preference relation would be repre-
sented by the corresponding utility function.
No less original is the analysis of game theory in chapter 8. Focusing on dynamic 
games, García de la Sienra provides an axiomatic formulation from which the theory-ele-
ment of neoclassical economics will emerge as a specialization. Its empirical content is cap-
tured as follows. On the one hand, García de la Sienra shows that behavioural strategies 
“determine a probability measure over the space of all possible histories of the game”, mak-
ing some trajectories more probable than others -those that maximize the expected utility 
of the agent. The empirical behaviour of economic agents generates a histogram over the 
same space. According to the author, the fundamental law of game theory states that such 
empirical distribution must approximate the probability measure -i.e., agents behave strate-
gically and the empirical distribution approximates an equilibrium of the game.
In chapter 9 García de la Sienra solves the main conceptual problems that have rav-
aged the labor theory of value. He provides a general definition of abstract labor and a rep-
resentational measurement of the same. He then shows that a uniform profit induces ab-
stract labor, and finally he proves that a given determination of abstract labor induces a 
system of prices which is unique up to similarity transformations. In chapter 10, the author 
recasts classical economics fusing the labor theory of value with “neoclassical” economics, 
proving the existence of an equilibrium in which the prices are induced by labor value, they 
clear the markets, and all the agents maximize utility.
In chapter 11, he reconstructs, in the same vein, with Sraffa’s Production of Commodi-
ties by Means of Commodities. And to close the book, and his sweeping survey of econom-
ics, García de la Sienra tackles econometrics building up on Aris Spanos’ analysis of the 
connection between probability theory and data generation processes via model specification. 
And then the book ends up abruptly, without a conclusions chapter.
As the reader may have already guessed, this is quite an impressive monograph for 
many different reasons. First, breadth and scope: A structuralist theory of economics is both 
a primer in some central themes in philosophy of science plus a broad introduction to eco-
nomic theories, covering on equal grounds neoclassical and Marxist approaches. Although 
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this is an exercise in formal philosophy of science, García de la Sienra makes the philosophi-
cal message clear at every step and, as conveyed —I hope— in the summary above, there are 
plenty of insightful intuitions. There are also some perplexities, let me just comment on a 
salient one.
Like many others, I have the impression that structuralist approach is perhaps too 
powerful, since it can reconstruct formally almost every articulated doctrine with a mini-
mal amount of empirical content. Treating neoclassical and Marxist approaches on equal 
grounds shows, in my view, this sheer excess of power. Most practitioners and methodol-
ogists of economics would see these two approaches in open contradiction: García de la 
Sienra shows, with his reconstruction, that this is clearly not the case. Except that his re-
construction becomes something more than meta-theory: García del Sienra is actively pick-
ing up those threads in economics that will fit better with the structuralist template. This 
may be a legitimate strategy. After all, Suppes and his school tried to capture the distin-
guishing traits of the most successful scientific theories. If economics wants to achieve the 
same success, we should better focus on the structures it shares with other scientific disci-
plines.
Here comes the second perplexity: García de la Sienra’s analysis stops every time at the 
same point: the identification of the empirical claim of the theories reconstructed. He says 
very little about the truth of these empirical claims, despite decades of debate on whether 
economics succeeds at grasping the truth about the phenomena under analysis. But the rea-
son for this, as he told me personally, is that whether a theory is successful in some applica-
tions is an entirely empirical matter. I hope the discussion of this empirical matter will pro-
vide a good enough reason for García de la Sienra to keep writing on economics.
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